Best practices for setting up Amazon Macie with AWS Organizations

In this post, we’ll walk through the best practices to implement before you enable Amazon Macie across all of your AWS accounts within AWS Organizations.

Amazon Macie is a data classification and data protection service that uses machine learning and pattern matching to help secure your critical data in AWS. To do this, Macie first automatically provides an inventory of Amazon Simple Storage Service (Amazon S3) buckets in AWS accounts managed by Macie and identifies S3 buckets with security risks, including unencrypted buckets, publicly accessible buckets, and buckets shared with AWS accounts external to AWS Organizations. Second, Macie applies machine learning and pattern matching techniques to the buckets you select to discover, identify, and create alerts for sensitive data, such as personally identifiable information (PII). With the visibility provided by Macie, you can centrally manage your sensitive data findings across your data estate and automate and take actions on Macie findings.

By enabling Amazon Macie within AWS Organizations, you immediately start receiving the benefits of viewing your Macie policy findings and sensitive data findings from jobs that ran for member AWS accounts. When you enable Macie for member accounts, a service-linked role is created within each member AWS account. Macie uses a service-linked role (AWSServiceRoleForAmazonMacie) to monitor resources on your behalf. The service-linked role has a trust relationship with the Macie service (macie.amazonaws.com). For more information about using Macie in your AWS Organizations architecture, see the AWS Security Reference Architecture (AWS SRA).

The best practices we’ll walk through include how to create least-privilege AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) policies for Macie-delegated administrators and for security engineers who will use Macie on a day-to-day basis. We’ll also show you how to create classification buckets, provide you with the correct resource permissions to allow the Macie service-linked role in each AWS account, and cover how to troubleshoot common issues.

IAM roles to provision for Amazon Macie

The least-privilege principle is important when managing access to sensitive data within your AWS accounts. In this section, we’ll show you how to create least-privilege IAM roles for the following personas for Macie:

  1. Data administrator
  2. Data security engineers
  3. DevOps/DevSecOps engineer
  4. Macie sensitive data findings reviewer

The personas can vary based on your organization, and this list is primarily meant to serve as an example. You will need to align the appropriate permissions to each role in order to enable Macie with the principle of least privilege. You can create your own customer managed policies after you know the specific permissions required for each persona.

Important: In general, AWS strongly recommends you limit the use of wildcards where possible. However, in some of the persona policies that follow, wildcards are necessary to accomplish the task. To implement the principle of least privilege where wildcards must be used, you should put limits on the resources that the persona can access. You can do this by adding condition keys for Macie; or if you deployed Macie by using AWS Organizations, you can add a condition for aws:ResourceOrgId.

Persona 1: Data administrator

This persona is a data administrator who is responsible for setting up and configuring Macie within AWS Organizations. To enforce separation of duties, this persona is not able to view or access Macie findings. You can perform the following steps to verify that the entity has the required permissions to enable the Macie-delegated administrator, and onboard the member AWS accounts within AWS Organizations. You can find the full procedure for each step by following the links to the Macie User Guide.

  1. Verify your permissions
  2. Designate the delegated Macie administrator account
  3. Automatically enable and add new organization accounts
  4. Enable and add existing organization accounts

It’s important to note that Macie is a Regional service. This means that the designation of a Macie administrator account is a Regional designation. A Macie administrator account in a specific AWS Region can manage Macie for member accounts only in that Region. To centrally manage Macie accounts in multiple Regions, the management account must log in to each Region where the organization uses Macie, and then designate the Macie administrator account in each of those Regions. You can use a single Macie administrator account to centrally manage up to 5,000 AWS accounts.

In the following policy, replace <account-id> with the Macie-delegated administrator account ID.

{ "Version": "2012-10-17", "Statement": [ { "Sid": "OrganizationsReadAccess", "Effect": "Allow", "Action": [ "organizations:ListDelegatedAdministrators", "organizations:ListAccounts", "organizations:DescribeOrganization", "organizations:ListAWSServiceAccessForOrganization" ], "Resource": "*" }, { "Sid": "AWSServiceAccess", "Effect": "Allow", "Action": "organizations:EnableAWSServiceAccess", "Resource": "*", "Condition": { "StringLikeIfExists": { "organizations:ServicePrincipal": "macie.amazonaws.com" } } }, { "Sid": "RegisterDelegatedAdministrator", "Effect": "Allow", "Action": "organizations:RegisterDelegatedAdministrator", "Resource": "arn:*:organizations::*:<account-id>", "Condition": { "StringLikeIfExists": { "organizations:ServicePrincipal": "macie.amazonaws.com" } } } ]
}

Persona 2: Data security engineer

This persona is a data security engineer who has day-to-day responsibility for reviewing Macie findings or Macie sensitive data discovery job configurations. Depending on your use case, you may need to separate this persona into two distinct personas where one is responsible to view Macie findings and the other to set Macie job configurations. To allow an IAM principal read-only permissions to view the Macie dashboard, configurations, and features, you can use the following policy. To enforce least privilege and restrict the resources to the Macie-delegated administrator, replace <region> with the AWS Region in which the delegated administrator is designated, and replace <account-id> with the Macie delegated administrator account ID.

{ "Version": "2012-10-17", "Statement": [ { "Sid": "MacieJobConfiguration", "Effect": "Allow", "Action": [ "macie2:GetFindingsFilter", "macie2:DescribeClassificationJob", "macie2:GetCustomDataIdentifier", "macie2:BatchGetCustomDataIdentifiers", "macie2:ListTagsForResource", "macie2:GetMember", "macie2:GetAllowList" ], "Resource": [ "arn:aws:macie2:<region>:<account-id>:custom-data-identifier/*", "arn:aws:macie2:<region>:<account-id>:findings-filter/*", "arn:aws:macie2:<region>:<account-id>:member/*", "arn:aws:macie2:<region>:<account-id>:classification-job/*", "arn:aws:macie2:<region>:<account-id>:allow-list/*" ] }, { "Sid": "MacieFindings", "Effect": "Allow", "Action": [ "macie2:ListFindings", "macie2:ListClassificationJobs", "macie2:ListFindingsFilters", "macie2:GetFindings", "macie2:GetUsageTotals", "macie2:GetSensitiveDataOccurrencesAvailability", "macie2:GetFindingsPublicationConfiguration", "macie2:GetSensitiveDataOccurrences", "macie2:GetClassificationExportConfiguration", "macie2:GetUsageStatistics", "macie2:GetRevealConfiguration", "macie2:GetFindingStatistics", "macie2:GetBucketStatistics", "macie2:GetMacieSession", "macie2:ListMembers", "macie2:ListAllowLists", "macie2:DescribeBuckets", "macie2:ListCustomDataIdentifiers", "macie2:ListManagedDataIdentifiers", "macie2:SearchResources", "macie2:ListInvitations" ], "Resource": "*" } ]
}

Persona 3: DevOps/DevSecOps engineer

This persona is a DevOps or DevSecOps engineer who is responsible for building and maintaining applications that run on AWS resources. These application builders typically receive top-level security guidance from central security, and they are directly responsible for the security of the applications that they design, build, and operate in AWS. DevSecOps engineers might need limited additional IAM permissions to configure Macie discovery jobs, depending on how Macie will be used within AWS Organizations. To allow an IAM principal the ability to pause or stop Macie jobs, you can add the following policy. Be sure to replace <region> with the AWS Region in which the delegated administrator is designated, and replace <account-id> with the Macie delegated administrator AWS account number.

{ "Version": "2012-10-17", "Statement": [ { "Sid": "MacieUpdateJobs", "Effect": "Allow", "Action": [ "macie2:UpdateClassificationJob", "macie2:DescribeClassificationJob" ], "Resource": "arn:aws:macie2:<region>:<account-id>:classification-job/*" }, { "Sid": "MacieListJobs", "Effect": "Allow", "Action": [ "macie2:GetClassificationExportConfiguration", "macie2:GetMacieSession", "macie2:ListClassificationJobs" ], "Resource": "*" } ]
}

Persona 4: Macie sensitive data findings reviewer

This persona is a reviewer (usually a security engineer) who is responsible for investigating the sensitive data associated with Macie findings. There are a number of ways this persona can be set up, based on your specific use case and the needs of your organization. In this section, we will describe two of the options for setting up this persona.

Option 1: Enable and use Macie to retrieve and reveal sensitive data samples from the delegated Macie account where findings are consolidated

In this option, Macie doesn’t use the Macie service-linked role for your account to perform these tasks. Instead, you use your IAM identity to locate, retrieve, encrypt, and reveal the samples for sensitive findings. You can retrieve and reveal sensitive data samples for a finding if you’re allowed to access the requisite resources and data, and you’re allowed to perform the requisite actions. All the requisite actions are logged in AWS CloudTrail. In the following policy, be sure to replace <account-id>, <region>, and <key-id> with your own values.

{ "Version": "2012-10-17", "Statement": [ { "Sid": "MacieReveal", "Effect": "Allow", "Action": [ "macie2: UpdateRevealConfiguration", "macie2:GetRevealConfiguration
], "Resource": " arn:aws:macie2:*:<account-id>:*" }, { "Sid": "KMSPermissions", "Effect": "Allow", "Action": [ "kms:Decrypt", "kms:DescribeKey", "kms:GenerateDataKey"
], "Resource": "arn:aws:kms:<region>:<account-id>:key/<key-id>" } ]
}

Option 2: Create IAM roles to review findings and objects in the same AWS account where objects are located

For a command line utility to help you investigate the sensitive data, you can use the Macie Finding Data Reveal project. The Macie Finding Data Reveal project needs permissions to invoke macie:GetFindings on the account and s3:GetObject on the specific object reported in the finding.

In the following policy, be sure to replace <DOC-EXAMPLE-BUCKET> with the values for the S3 bucket where the finding is reported; and replace <account-id>, <region>, and <key-id> with your own values. You will also need to configure the KMS key and S3 bucket resource policies to allow permissions to your IAM role.

{ "Version": "2012-10-17", "Statement": [ { "Sid": "InvokeMacieFindings", "Effect": "Allow", "Action": "macie2:GetFindings", "Resource": "*" }, { "Sid": "ReportedS3Object", "Effect": "Allow", "Action": "s3:GetObject", "Resource": " arn:aws:s3:::<DOC-EXAMPLE-BUCKET>/*" }, { "Sid": "KMSPermissions", "Effect": "Allow", "Action": [ "kms:Decrypt", "kms:DescribeKey", "kms:GenerateDataKey" ], "Resource": "arn:aws:kms:<region>:<account-id>:key/<key-id>" } ]
}

If you use an IAM role in the same AWS account, you can specify permissions to access the object and encryption key by using resource policies, and you can leave off the ReportedS3Object and KMSPermissions statement ID (Sid).

Apply SCPs to restrict unauthorized changes to Macie

After you create the personas, you need to verify that the Macie configurations to manage Macie members within AWS Organizations are only updated by authorized IAM principals. The following is an example service control policy (SCP) that you can use to prevent users from disabling Macie, or from modifying Macie configurations within the organization. Make sure to replace <account-id> and <data-admin-role-name> with your own values for the authorized IAM principal.

Note: When you use SCPs within a multi-account structure, it is important to keep in mind quotas that affect AWS Organizations.

{ "Version": "2012-10-17", "Statement": [ { "Sid": "RestrictAmazonMacie", "Effect": "Deny", "Action": [ "macie2:DeleteMember", "macie2:DisableMacie", "macie2:DisableOrganizationAdminAccount", "macie2:DisassociateFromAdministratorAccount", "macie2:DisassociateMember", "macie2:UpdateMacieSession", "macie2:UpdateMemberSession" ], "Resource": [ "*" ], "Condition": { "StringNotLike": { "aws:PrincipalArn": [ "arn:aws:iam::<account-id>:role/<data-admin-role-name>" ] } } } ]
}

Allow the Macie service-linked IAM role to scan S3 objects

When Macie analyzes files, it needs permissions to analyze encrypted files. This is important so that you don’t have blind spots in your data protection initiatives.

Before you run a Macie job against S3 objects, make sure that existing KMS keys that are used to encrypt the S3 buckets also grant the Macie service-linked IAM role in the AWS account the necessary permissions to decrypt the S3 objects. For more information, see Service-linked roles for Amazon Macie. To confirm that Macie can scan encrypted objects, the associated KMS key resource policies must allow the Macie service-linked role to use the KMS key to decrypt objects.

Furthermore, depending on the object’s type of encryption, Macie might not be able to fully scan the object. The following table summarizes types of object encryption and the ability Macie has to scan the object. For more information, see Macie supported encryption types.

S3 object encryption type Macie scan ability
Client-side encryption Macie cannot decrypt and analyze the object. Macie can only store and report metadata for the object.
Server-side encryption with Amazon S3 managed keys (SSE-S3) Macie can decrypt and analyze the object.
Server-side encryption with AWS managed AWS KMS encryption (AWS-KMS) Macie can decrypt and analyze the object.
Server-side encryption with customer managed AWS KMS encryption (SSE-KMS) Macie can decrypt and analyze the object if Macie is authorized to use the KMS key. Otherwise, Macie can only store and report metadata for the object.
Server-side encryption with customer provided key (SSE-C) Macie cannot decrypt and analyze the object. Macie can only store and report metadata for the object.

Investigating failed Macie scans of S3 objects

In the event Macie is unable to scan an S3 object, you can view the logs in an S3 bucket configured in the Macie delegated administrator account for sensitive data discovery results, or in centralized AWS CloudTrail logs. The following are common reasons why Macie might not be able to scan S3 objects, and the associated steps for remediating each issue.

KMS implicit deny

The Macie service-linked role (AWSServiceRoleForAmazonMacie) is not authorized to decrypt S3 objects in Macie member accounts, because no resource-based policy allows the kms:Decrypt action. Check for the following error message in AWS CloudTrail if the AWS KMS resource-based policy implicitly denies the Macie service-linked role. Your error message will show <account-id> and <region> as your own values.

sourceIPAddress: "macie.amazonaws.com" and eventSource : "kms.amazonaws.com" and eventName : "Decrypt" and errorCode : "AccessDenied" Filter the results by error message: “User: arn:aws:sts::<account-id>:assumed-role/AWSServiceRoleForAmazonMacie/classifier-content-fetcher is not authorized to perform: kms:Decrypt on resource: arn:aws:kms:<region>:key/key-id because no resource-based policy allows the kms:Decrypt action…”

In order to remediate a KMS implicit deny error for a customer-managed key, add the following to the customer managed key policy. Be sure to replace <account_name> with your own value.

{ "Sid": "Allow Macie Decrypt S3", "Effect": "Allow", "Principal": { "AWS": "*" }, "Action": [ "kms:Decrypt", "kms:DescribeKey" ], "Resource": "*", "Condition": { "StringEquals": { "aws:PrincipalArn": "arn:aws:iam::<account_name>:role/aws-service-role/macie.amazonaws.com/AWSServiceRoleForAmazonMacie" } } }

KMS explicit deny

The Macie service-linked role (AWSServiceRoleForAmazonMacie) is not authorized to decrypt S3 objects in Macie member accounts, because resource-based policies explicitly deny the kms:Decrypt action for the Macie service-linked role. Check for the following error message in AWS CloudTrail if the AWS KMS resource-based policy explicitly denies the Macie service-linked role. Your error message will show <account_name> and <region> as your own values.

sourceIPAddress : "macie.amazonaws.com" and eventSource : "kms.amazonaws.com" and eventName : "Decrypt" and errorCode : "AccessDenied" Filter the results by error message:
“User:arn:aws:sts::<account_name>:assumed-role/AWSServiceRoleForAmazonMacie/classifier-content-fetcher is not authorized to perform: kms:Decrypt on resource: arn:aws:kms:<region>:key/key-id with an explicit deny in resource-based policy…”

In order to remediate a KMS explicit deny error, update the policy statement to allow the Macie service-linked role access to decrypt and describe key actions. Be sure to replace <account_name> with your own value.

{ "Sid": "Deny Macie Decrypt S3", "Effect": "Deny", "Principal": { "AWS": "*" }, "Action": [ "kms:Decrypt", "kms:DescribeKey" ], "Resource": "*", "Condition": { "StringEquals": { "aws:PrincipalArn": "arn:aws:iam::<account_name>:role/aws-service-role/macie.amazonaws.com/AWSServiceRoleForAmazonMacie" } } }

S3 explicit deny

The Macie service-linked role (AWSServiceRoleForAmazonMacie) is explicitly denied in the S3 bucket policy. Check for the following error messages in AWS CloudTrail for S3 explicit deny.

userIdentity.sessionContext.sessionIssuer.userName: "AWSServiceRoleForAmazonMacie" and eventSource: "s3.amazonaws.com" and eventName: " GetBucketEncryption" and errorcode: “ServerSideEncryptionConfigurationNotFoundError” and errormessage: “The server side encryption configuration was not found” OR userIdentity.sessionContext.sessionIssuer.userName: "AWSServiceRoleForAmazonMacie" and eventSource: "s3.amazonaws.com" and eventName: "GetBucketReplication" and errorcode: " ReplicationConfigurationNotFoundError" and errormessage: “The replication configuration was not found” OR userIdentity.sessionContext.sessionIssuer.userName: "AWSServiceRoleForAmazonMacie" and eventSource: "s3.amazonaws.com" and eventName: " GetBucketTagging" and errorcode: " NoSuchTagSet" and errormessage: “The TagSet does not exist” OR userIdentity.sessionContext.sessionIssuer.userName: "AWSServiceRoleForAmazonMacie" and eventSource: "s3.amazonaws.com" and eventName: "GetBucketAcl" and responseElements: "null" OR userIdentity.sessionContext.sessionIssuer.userName: "AWSServiceRoleForAmazonMacie" and eventSource: "s3.amazonaws.com" and eventName: " GetBucketPublicAccessBlock" and responseElements: "null" OR userIdentity.sessionContext.sessionIssuer.userName: "AWSServiceRoleForAmazonMacie" and eventSource: "s3.amazonaws.com" and eventName: "GetBucketLocation" and responseElements: "null" OR userIdentity.sessionContext.sessionIssuer.userName: "AWSServiceRoleForAmazonMacie" and eventSource: "s3.amazonaws.com" and eventName: "GetBucketVersioning" and responseElements: "null" OR userIdentity.sessionContext.sessionIssuer.userName: "AWSServiceRoleForAmazonMacie" and eventSource: "s3.amazonaws.com" and eventName: " GetBucketPolicy" and errorcode: "NoSuchBucketPolicy" and errormessage: “The bucket policy does not exist” OR userIdentity.sessionContext.sessionIssuer.userName: "AWSServiceRoleForAmazonMacie" and eventSource: "s3.amazonaws.com" and eventName: " GetBucketEncryption" and responseElements: "null" OR userIdentity.sessionContext.sessionIssuer.userName: "AWSServiceRoleForAmazonMacie" and eventSource: "s3.amazonaws.com" and eventName: " GetBucketPolicy" and responseElements: "null"

Note: Nearly all S3 explicit deny and S3 object ownership error messages have the same event names. See the Ensure S3 and KMS resource policy compliance section in this post to view the S3 object ownership setting.

Macie cannot decrypt and analyze S3 objects if there is an explicit deny in the S3 bucket policy. The following is an example of an S3 bucket policy that explicitly denies the Macie service-linked role. Be sure to replace <DOC-EXAMPLE-BUCKET> and <account_id> with your own values.

{ "Version": "2012-10-17", "Statement": [ { "Sid": "S3ExplicitDeny", "Effect": "Deny", "Principal": { "AWS": "*" }, "Action": [ "s3:GetObject", "s3:GetObjectTagging" ], "Resource": [ "arn:aws:s3:::<DOC-EXAMPLE-BUCKET>/*", "arn:aws:s3:::<DOC-EXAMPLE-BUCKET>" ], "Condition": { "StringEquals": { "aws:PrincipalArn": "arn:aws:iam::<account_id>:role/aws-service-role/macie.amazonaws.com/AWSServiceRoleForAmazonMacie" } } } ]
}

Macie can decrypt and analyze S3 objects if there is no explicit deny in the S3 bucket. The following is an example of the permission for the S3 bucket policy to explicitly allow the Macie service-linked role to have access to your S3 bucket. Be sure to replace <DOC-EXAMPLE-BUCKET> and <account-id> with your own values.

{ "Version": "2012-10-17", "Statement": [ { "Sid": "Allow Macie S3 Read", "Effect": "Allow", "Principal": { "AWS": "*" }, "Action": [ "s3:ListBucket", "s3:GetReplicationConfiguration", "s3:GetObject*", "s3:GetLifecycleConfiguration", "s3:GetEncryptionConfiguration", "s3:GetBucket*" ], "Resource": [ "arn:aws:s3:::<DOC-EXAMPLE-BUCKET>/*", "arn:aws:s3:::<DOC-EXAMPLE-BUCKET>" ], "Condition": { "StringEquals": { "aws:PrincipalArn": "arn:aws:iam::<account-id>:role/aws-service-role/macie.amazonaws.com/AWSServiceRoleForAmazonMacie“ } } } ] }

S3 Object Ownership

Macie is unable to scan S3 objects that are owned by another AWS account, due to access control list (ACL) settings and permissions. Event names are identical for both S3 explicit deny errors and S3 Object Ownership errors. S3 explicit deny has the following additional two event names.

userIdentity.sessionContext.sessionIssuer.userName: "AWSServiceRoleForAmazonMacie" and eventSource: "s3.amazonaws.com" and eventName: " GetBucketEncryption" and errorcode: “ServerSideEncryptionConfigurationNotFoundError” and errormessage: “The server side encryption configuration was not found” OR userIdentity.sessionContext.sessionIssuer.userName: "AWSServiceRoleForAmazonMacie" and eventSource: "s3.amazonaws.com" and eventName: " GetBucketPolicy" and errorcode: "NoSuchBucketPolicy" and errormessage: “The bucket policy does not exist”

The S3 Object Ownership feature has the following three settings that you can use to control ownership of objects that are uploaded to your bucket, and to disable or enable ACLs. We recommend that you disable ACLs on your S3 buckets.

  • Bucket owner enforced (recommended) – ACLs are disabled, and the bucket owner automatically owns and has full control over every object in the bucket. ACLs no longer affect permissions to data in the S3 bucket. The bucket uses policies to define access control.
  • Bucket owner preferred – The bucket owner owns and has full control over new objects that other accounts write to the bucket with the bucket-owner-full-control canned ACL.
  • Object writer (default) – The AWS account that uploads an object owns the object, has full control over it, and can grant other users access to it through ACLs.

In order to remediate an S3 object ownership issue, there are two options available:

Option 1: Change object ownership settings to bucket owner enforced (recommended). When you disable ACLs, it changes the ownership of existing objects to the bucket owner account. You should consider the following scenarios prior to changing the S3 Object Ownership setting.

S3 objects in the source bucket (account A) are encrypted with a customer-managed key, and you copy the object in the destination bucket (account B) that has the object writer object ownership setting and its own customer managed key. If you copy S3 objects from the source bucket (account A) to the destination bucket (account B), and you do not specify a customer-managed key to use during the copy command, and the object ownership setting in the destination bucket (account B) is bucket owner enforced (ACLs disabled), then this will result in an object ownership change to bucket owner. These actions will also set the object’s server-side encryption to use the encryption settings in the destination bucket (account B).

However, if you specify a customer-managed key during the S3 copy command, then the object’s server-side encryption remains with the source bucket account (account A) customer managed key.

Option 2: Use S3 batch operations to copy objects and set ACLs. Changing the object ownership

setting to bucket owner preferred only applies to new objects and not the existing objects. You can use one one-time batch operation to set ACLs on existing objects.

Ensure S3 and KMS resource policy compliance

Another best practice to follow when you enable Macie with AWS Organizations is to use Macie to verify your organization’s policy compliance for S3 objects and KMS resources. In the Macie-delegated admin account, the summary page provides an overview of S3 data and security and access control in your organization in AWS Organizations. Users can view information about S3 security posture, such as whether S3 buckets are public or not, server-side encryption of S3 buckets, and whether S3 buckets are shared inside or outside of your organization. Data privacy and compliance groups can get organization-wide visibility across their accounts and buckets.

Your organization is responsible for introducing guardrails based on your organization’s security policies. To automate compliance checks for S3 objects and KMS resources, make sure to update your continuous integration and continuous deployment (CI/CD) pipeline. This will allow you to set up continuous compliance checks for the Macie service-linked role by using tools like CloudFormation Guard or Open Policy Agent.

In order to check S3 object ownership settings, you can use AWS Command Line Interface (AWS CLI) commands to view bucket ownership settings. Currently, Macie and AWS Config do not report on S3 object ownership as part of the resource configuration. You can run the following AWS CLI command in AWS accounts within AWS Organizations, making sure to replace <DOC-EXAMPLE-BUCKET> with your own value, to view bucket ownership settings. This can be scripted to list all AWS accounts within AWS Organizations, list all S3 buckets within the AWS account, then get the bucket ownership configuration.

aws s3api get-bucket-ownership-controls --bucket <DOC-EXAMPLE-BUCKET>

After checking these ownership settings, you can run the following AWS CLI commands to view the S3 objects ownership settings, making sure to replace <DOC-EXAMPLE-BUCKET> with your own value.

aws s3api list-objects-v2 —bucket <DOC-EXAMPLE-BUCKET> —fetch-owner—query ”Contents[?Owner.ID!='CURRENT-ID'].{Key:Key,Owner:Owner.DisplayName}" —output

Additional Macie best practices

You should also consider the following recommendations before you enable Macie, so that you can manage Macie findings and member accounts efficiently at scale:

  • Enable Macie using AWS Organizations to manage multiple accounts and to govern your environment as you grow and scale your AWS resources.
  • Enable Macie in all Regions where you have workloads with S3 buckets.
  • Enable Security Hub and Amazon Macie integration to send Macie findings to Security Hub (enabled by default).
  • Enable Security Hub Region aggregation to consolidate Macie findings in a single Region.
  • Ingest logs from AWS CloudWatch Logs to enable custom alerting for Macie sensitive data discovery job results.
  • In Macie settings, turn on the Auto-enable setting. That way, Macie will automatically be enabled for new accounts when the accounts are added to your organization in AWS Organizations.
  • Store sensitive data discovery results in an S3 bucket, with default encryption enabled, after you have configured your Macie delegated administrator account.

Conclusion

In this blog post, we walked you through the best practices to implement before you enable Amazon Macie across your AWS accounts within AWS Organizations. In order to efficiently use Macie within AWS Organizations, it is important to understand why failures can occur, how to investigate the logs, and how to remediate the issues for both existing and future resources.

Now that you have a better understanding of how to prepare for using Macie, try running a Macie sensitive data discovery job. The next aspect to start thinking about is how to review and respond to Macie findings. You can deploy another solution to automatically send notifications with Slack when Macie findings are generated.

If you have feedback about this post, submit comments in the Comments section below. If you have any questions about this post, start a thread on the Amazon Macie forum.

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Jonathan Nguyen

Jonathan Nguyen

Jonathan is a Shared Delivery Team Senior Security Consultant at AWS. His background is in AWS Security with a focus on threat detection and incident response. Today, he helps enterprise customers develop a comprehensive security strategy and deploy security solutions at scale, and he trains customers on AWS Security best practices.

Ajay Rawat

Ajay Rawat

Ajay is a Security Consultant in a shared delivery team at AWS. He is a technology enthusiast who enjoys working with customers to solve their technical challenges and to improve their security posture in the cloud.