Lousy IoT Security
DTEN makes smart screens and whiteboards for videoconferencing systems. Forescout found that their security is terrible:
In total, our researchers discovered five vulnerabilities of four different kinds:
- Data exposure: PDF files of shared whiteboards (e.g. meeting notes) and other sensitive files (e.g., OTA — over-the-air updates) were stored in a publicly accessible AWS S3 bucket that also lacked TLS encryption (CVE-2019-16270, CVE-2019-16274).
- Unauthenticated web server: a web server running Android OS on port 8080 discloses all whiteboards stored locally on the device (CVE-2019-16271).
- Arbitrary code execution: unauthenticated root shell access through Android Debug Bridge (ADB) leads to arbitrary code execution and system administration (CVE-2019-16273).
- Access to Factory Settings: provides full administrative access and thus a covert ability to capture Windows host data from Android, including the Zoom meeting content (audio, video, screenshare) (CVE-2019-16272).
These aren’t subtle vulnerabilities. These are stupid design decisions made by engineers who had no idea how to create a secure system. And this, in a nutshell, is the problem with the Internet-of-Things.
From a Wired article:
One issue that jumped out at the researchers: The DTEN system stored notes and annotations written through the whiteboard feature in an Amazon Web Services bucket that was exposed on the open internet. This means that customers could have accessed PDFs of each others’ slides, screenshots, and notes just by changing the numbers in the URL they used to view their own. Or anyone could have remotely nabbed the entire trove of customers’ data. Additionally, DTEN hadn’t set up HTTPS web encryption on the customer web server to protect connections from prying eyes. DTEN fixed both of these issues on October 7. A few weeks later, the company also fixed a similar whiteboard PDF access issue that would have allowed anyone on a company’s network to access all of its stored whiteboard data.
The researchers also discovered two ways that an attacker on the same network as DTEN devices could manipulate the video conferencing units to monitor all video and audio feeds and, in one case, to take full control. DTEN hardware runs Android primarily, but uses Microsoft Windows for Zoom. The researchers found that they can access a development tool known as “Android Debug Bridge,” either wirelessly or through USB ports or ethernet, to take over a unit. The other bug also relates to exposed Android factory settings. The researchers note that attempting to implement both operating systems creates more opportunities for misconfigurations and exposure. DTEN says that it will push patches for both bugs by the end of the year.
Posted on December 19, 2019 at 6:31 AM • 0 Comments