TLS 1.3 approved

Protocol Action: ‘The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3’ to Proposed Standard (draft-ietf-tls-tls13-28.txt)


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The IESG has approved the following document:
- 'The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3' (draft-ietf-tls-tls13-28.txt) as Proposed Standard This document is the product of the Transport Layer Security Working Group. The IESG contact persons are Kathleen Moriarty and Eric Rescorla. A URL of this Internet Draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-tls13/ Technical Summary This document specifies version 1.3 of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. TLS allows client/server applications to communicate over the Internet in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping, tampering, and message forgery. Working Group Summary The document is the work product of the members of the TLS WG. There is strong consensus in the working group for this document. The area that was most controversial was around the inclusion of a 0-RTT mode that has different security properties than the rest of TLS. s1.3 lists the major differences from TLS1.2, as agreed by the contributors; we do not think that the RFC needs to list the changes that occurred between each draft. The draft has had 3 WGLCs to address various issues and the chairs assessment was fair in each of these discussions. At this point there are no known outstanding issue. While I personally do not agree with inclusion of 0-RTT because there are bound to be successful attacks against the mitigations in the future, I do agree with the chair's assessment of the WG consensus and am pleased with the additional text on mitigating the associated risks with 0-RTT. Document Quality There are over 10 interoperable implementations of the protocol from different sources written in different languages. The major web browser vendors and TLS libraries vendors have draft implementations or have indicated they will support the protocol in the future. In addition to having extensive review in the TLS working group, the protocol has received unprecedented security review by the academic community. Several TRON (TLS Ready or Not) conferences were held with academic community to give them a chance to present their findings for TLS. This has resulted in improvements to the protocol. There was also much consideration and discussion around any contentious points, resolved through polls and working group last calls. Please note that ID-nits complains about the obsoleted/ updated RFCs not being listed in the abstract. This is intentional because the abstract is now a concise and comprehensive overview and is free form citations, as per RFC7322. Personnel The Document Shepherd is Sean Turner. The responsible AD is Kathleen Moriarty. The IANA Expert(s) for the registries in this document are Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf at gmail.com>, Rich Salz <rsalz at akamai.com>, and Nick Sullivan <nick at cloudflare.com> . IANA Note This document requests the creation of the TLS SignatureScheme Registry with values assigned via Specification Required [RFC8126]. This document requests the reference for several registries be updated to point to this document. The registries include: - TLS Cipher Suite Registry, updated via via Specification Required [RFC8126] - TLS ContentType Registry, future values allocated via Standards Action [RFC8126] - TLS Alert Registry, future values allocated via Standards Action [RFC8126] - TLS HandshakeType Registry, future values allocated via Standards Action [RFC8126] - TLS ExtensionType Registry, the policy is changed in ietf-tls-iana-registry-updates and this will be reflected in version 25 of the draft RFC Editor Note Please ensure a reference is added prior to final publication for the
text added in section
E.6. PSK Identity Exposure
of draft-ietf-tls-tls13